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DE PAUL LAV REVIEW
The argument that allowing discovery of insurance coverage opens the
door for discovering the defendant's entire financial status before judg-
ment, which would invade his right of privacy can be met by answering
that liability insurance policies contain unique characteristics due to statu-
tory regulation. In the Fisher case, the court pointed out that statutory
provisions confer an interest in such a policy on every member of the
public that is negligently injured and that the unique characteristics of a
liability insurance policy distinguish it from other financial resources.
After the Fisher case was decided in May, 1957, a motion for leave to
appear amicus curiae and file a brief in support of the petition for rehear-
ing, for and in behalf of five hundred ninety-two insurance companies,
was requested and granted. However, even after the rehearing in which
the opinion of Brooks v. Owen 24 was called to the attention of the court,
the Illinois Supreme Court held to its original decision. What influence
the contrary case of Gallimnore v. Dye 2 5 will have on the rule of the
Fisher case is undetermined at this time.
24 97 So. 2d 693 (Fla., 1957).
25 E.D. I11., Docket No. 3,851 (Jan. 13, 1958).
LABOR LAW-STRIKE UNLAWFUL WHEN CONTRACT
DISPUTE IS PENDING BEFORE RAILROAD
ADJUSTMENT BOARD
The Norfolk and Portsmouth Belt Line Railroad proposed to change
the established starting and quitting points for five of its train crews. The
carrier based its right to initiate this plan on its interpretation of a clause
in the collective bargaining agreement which stated, "The point of going
on and off duty shall be governed by local conditions." The union main-
tained that this action by the carrier could be effected only with the con-
sent of the union or upon prior negotiation. After threat of strike and
petition by the union to the National Mediation Board, the parties were
referred to the Railroad Adjustment Board. The carrier submitted the dis-
pute to the Adjustment Board but the union again called for a strike. The
carrier petitioned the lower court for an injunction which was refused.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, the
judgment was reversed and a permanent injunction prohibiting the strike
was granted. The court impliedly stated that the carrier had the right to
initiate procedures, and the union could properly bring up complaints in
the established grievance procedure after the carrier has set the proposed
change into operation. Norfolk and Portsnoutb Belt Line R. Co. v.
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmnen, Lodge No. 514, 248 F.2d 34 (C.A.
4th, 1957).
The problem before this court is one of the most debated and oft-
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discussed problems in the field of labor-management relations. The court
was compelled to treat the problem of management's right to initiate and
carry out its plans without the prior consent of the union, where a term
in the collective agreements attempts to cover the proposed change.
Another issue, decided by the court, was the extent of the Railroad Ad-
justment Board's jurisdiction. Both issues pose major problems in the
efficient conduct of business and unions. In deciding these questions, the
court necessarily went into the background of the applicable provisions
of the Railway Labor Act.
2
The stated congressional purpose in enacting the Railway Labor Act of
1943 is to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes
concerning rates of pay, rules and working conditions (Section 2 (4)) and
to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing
out of grievances and out of interpretation or application of agreements
covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions (Section 2 (5) ).3 Sec-
tion 2 (4) is generally held to concern itself with the making of the con-
tract and major disputes 4 while Section 2(5) deals with the application of
the contract and minor disputes. 5 Congress also set up the means for
carrying out its purpose, and in Section 3 created the Railroad Adjust-
ment Board to settle minor disputes.0 The act gives employees the right
to bring action, either in a court or before the Adjustment Board, for
grievance disputes. 7 The petitioner before the Adjustment Board is given
the right to file suit for enforcement of a non-money award.8
Throughout the years, the act has been interpreted so as to confer upon
courts the power to enforce the provisions of the act and the right to
issue injunctions to prohibit strikes in case of non-compliance with the
decree of the Adjustment Board.9 This is a departure from the anti-
1 45 U.S.C.A. § 153(1943).
2 45 U.S.C.A. 151 et seq. (1943). 3 45 U.S.C.A. § 151a (1943).
4 Slocum v. Delaware, 339 U.S. 239 (1950); Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No.
40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937); Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. I.C.C.,
147 F. 2d 312 (App. D.C., 1945); Order of Ry. Conductors of America v. Nat'l Medi-
ation Board, 113 F. 2d 531 (App. D.C., 1940); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Nat'l
Mediation Board, 88 F. 2d 757 (App. D.C., 1936).
5 Chgo. R. & I. R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 229 F. 2d 926 (C.A. 7th, 1956).
Accord: Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. N.Y.C. R.R., 246 F. 2d 114 (C.A. 6th, 1957).
6 45 U.S.C.A. § 153 (1943). Slocum v. Delaware, 339 U.S. 239 (1950); Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen v. N.Y.C. R.R., 246 F. 2d 114 (C.A. 6th, 1957); Wash. Terminal v. Bos-
well, 124 F. 2d 235 (App. D.C., 1941).
7 Watson v. Mo.-Kan.-Texas R.R., 173 S.W. 2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App., 1943).
8 Wash. Terminal v. Boswell, 124 F. 2d 235 (App. D.C., 1941).
9 Switchmen's Union of N. America v. Natl Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297 (1943);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. N.Y.C. R.R., 246 F. 2d 114 (CA. 6th, 1957); Chgo.
R. & 1. R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 229 F. 2d 926 (C.A. 7th, 1956).
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injunction climate created by the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932.10 In the
case of Chgo. R. & 1. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen" the
court stated:
The Railway Labor Act ... embodies a complete plan for avoiding any inter-
ruption to commerce or the operation of any carrier engaged therein.... It does
not call for the aid or submit to the linitations of the Norris LaGuardia Act...
[for to submit to such limitations] would practically render the compulsory
features of the latter act [Railway Labor Act] nugatory.12
Justice Brown, dissenting in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v.
Central of Georgia R. Co.1' said a difference concerning the meaning and
effect of a contract is a grievance which must be submitted to and decided
by the Railroad Adjustment Board.
In the instant case, the court strengthened the rule that where there is
a term in the contract designed to cover certain conditions, management
has the right to initiate procedures and plans and the union is obliged to
follow the dictates of management. 14 If the union disagrees with the policy
of management in regard to this term of the contract, the union must
wait until the plan is put into effect, and at that time may bring up the
question in the ordinary manner under established grievance procedure."
The case of Fay v. Phenix Soda Fountain Co.16 is an illustration of this
rule. There the management closed its plant one day a week. Although
the union was opposed to this change, they waited until the change had
been effected, and then brought up the question in accordance with the
grievance machinery. The court approved of this process and ordered
management to arbitrate the matter with the union.
In the principal case, the dispute centered mainly upon the union's con-
tention that the clause of the contract did not give management the right
to initiate the changes. The Railway Labor Act has been interpreted by
the courts to give primary jurisdiction over interpretation of contract
10 29 U.S.C.A. S 101 (1947): "No court of the United States .. .shall have jurisdic-
tion to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case in-
volving or growing out of a labor dispute...
11 229 F. 2d 926 (C.A. 7th, 1956).
12 Ibid., at 932. Accord: Manion v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 353 U.S. 927 (1957);
Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949); Virginian Ry.
v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
N.Y.C. R.R., 246 F. 2d 114 (C.A. 6th, 1957); Watson v. Mo.-Kan.-Texas R.R., 173 S.W.
2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App., 1943).
13 229 F. 2d 901 (C.A. 5th, 1956).
14 Order of Ry. Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561 (1946); Williams v. Jacksonville
Terminal, 315 U.S. 386 (1942).
15Fay v. Phenix Soda Fountain Co., 153 N.Y.S. 2d 153 (S. Ct., 1956).
16 Ibid.
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clauses to the Railroad Adjustment Board. 7 Several cases have held that
the Adjustment Board has the right to arbitrate disputes after the con-
tract has been made and that the decision of the Adjustment Board is
final.18 Therefore, in the principal case, the court found that the Adjust-
ment Board had jurisdiction to decide whether the clause of the contract
in dispute was sufficiently broad to encompass the right of management to
unilaterally initiate changes. Since the question was presented to the Ad-
justment Board by the carrier, the union could not strike until final deter-
rination of the dispute by the Adjustment Board. 19
In a belated effort, the union admitted the validity of the carrier's con-
tention that the action was in accordance with the clause in the contract,
but the court pointed out that although this concession would leave the
matter before the Adjustment Board a moot question, a strike was still
unlawful.20
Thus, the enforcement of the Railway Labor Act is strengthened by
the decision in the instant case. The determination of the dispute between
management and the union is within the jurisdiction of the Adjustment
Board, and during the pendency of this dispute an injunction will issue
prohibiting a strike. In the words of the court:
It [Railway Labor Act] cannot leave them free to strike in aid of proposed
contract changes when they have not fully processed any such proposal as a
"major dispute" under the required procedures of the Act.21
17 Texas & N.O. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930);
Sampsell v. B. & 0. R.R., 235 F. 2d 569 (C.A. 4th, 1956); Alabaugh v. B. & 0. R.R., 222
F. 2d 861 (C.A. 4th, 1955).
18 Watson v. Mo.-Kan.-Texas R.R., 173 S.W. 2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App., 1943). In
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. N.Y.C. R.R., 246 F. 2d 114, 118 (C.A. 6th, 1957) the
court said, "A minor dispute may be submitted to the National Railroad Adjustment
Board by either party, and the award of the Board is final and binding on both parties."
19 Chgo. R. & I. R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 229 F. 2d1 926 (C.A. 7th,
1956).
20E.J.E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945). Major disputes are differences arising
out of proposals for new contracts or of changes in existing contractual or legal obli-
gations or relations. The Railway Labor Act provides for procedures to be followed
in the event of a major dispute, but compulsions go only to insure that those procedures
are exhausted before resorting to self-help. No authority is given to decide the dispute
and no such power is intended, unless the parties themselves agree to arbitration.
21 Norfolk and P.B.L.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 248 F. 2d 34, 46 (C.A. 4th,
1957).
LABOR LAW-"UNLAWFULLY ASSISTED" UNION
WHICH HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH FILING
REQUIREMENTS MAY OBTAIN RECOGNI-
TION WITHOUT CERTIFICATION
The National Labor Relations Board found that Bowman Transporta-
tion, Inc., unlawfully assisted District 50, United Mine Workers to organ-
